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EFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA IN RANDOM BINARY GAMES
MATTEO QUATTROPANI† AND MARCO SCARSINI#
Abstract. We consider normal-form games with n players and two strategies for each player
where the payoffs are Bernoulli random variables. We define the average social utility associated
to a strategy profile as the sum of the payoffs of all players divided by n. We assume that payoff
vectors corresponding to different profiles are i.i.d., and the payoffs within the same profile are
conditionally independent given some underlying random parameter. Under these conditions we
examine the asymptotic behavior of the average social utilities that correspond to the optimum, to
the best and to the worst pure Nash equilibrium. We perform a detailed analysis of some particular
cases showing that these random quantities converge, as n → ∞, to some function of the models’
parameters. Moreover, we show that these functions exhibit some interesting phase-transition
phenomena.
1. Introduction
The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) is central in game theory. Nash (1950, 1951) proved that
every finite game admits mixed Nash equilibria (MNE). In general, pure Nash equilibria (PNE)
may fail to exist. Given that the concept of pure Nash equilibrium is epistemically more clearly
understood than the one of MNE, it is important to understand how rare it is to have games
without PNE. One way to address the problem is to consider games in normal form whose payoffs
are random. In a random game the number of PNE is also a random variable, whose distribution
is interesting to study.
It is known that this distribution depends on the assumptions made on the distribution of the
random payoffs. The simplest case that has been considered in the literature deals with i.i.d. payoffs
having a continuous distribution function. This implies that ties happen with probability zero. Even
in this simple case, although it is easy to compute the expected number of PNE, the characterization
of their exact distribution is non-trivial. Asymptotic results exist as either the number of players
or the number of strategies for each player diverge. In both cases the number of PNE converges to
a Poisson distribution with parameter 1.
Generalizations of the simple case can be achieved either by removing the assumptions that all
payoffs are independent or by allowing for discontinuities in their distribution functions, or both.
In both cases the number of PNE diverges and some central limit theorem (CLT) holds.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on this topic has focused on the distribution of the
number of PNE but not on their social utility (SU), i.e., the sum of the payoffs of each player. The
issue of efficiency of equilibria and its measure has received an attention for more than a century
and, at the end of the last millennium, has led to the definition of the price of anarchy (PoA) as a
pessimistic measure of inefficiency (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999, Papadimitriou, 2001a),
followed by the price of stability (PoS) as its optimistic counterpart (Schulz and Stier Moses, 2003,
Anshelevich et al., 2008). The PoA is the ratio of the optimum SU over the SU of the worst
equilibrium. The PoS is the ratio of the optimum SU over the SU of the best equilibrium. It is
interesting to study how these three quantities behave in a random game.
1.1. Our contribution. We consider a model with n players and two strategies for each player.
Payoffs are assumed to be random. To be more precise the payoff vectors corresponding to each
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strategy profile are assumed to be i.i.d. and payoffs within the same strategy profile s to be con-
ditionally i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, given a parameter Φ(s) distributed according to the
probability law pi on [0, 1]. A model with a similar dependence structure was considered in Rinott
and Scarsini (2000), but there the payoffs have a Gaussian distribution.
We will study the asymptotic behavior of the average social utilities (ASUs) in this game as
n → ∞. In particular, we focus our analysis on the optimal ASU, on the ASUs of the best, the
worst, and the typical PNE.
As a preliminary step, we will consider the asymptotic behavior of the random number of PNE.
We consider three relevant cases for the measure pi. First we look at the case where the support
of pi is the whole interval [0, 1] and we show that the asymptotic behavior of the number of PNE
does not depend on pi. Moreover we show that in this case the asymptotic behavior of the ASU of
the optimum, and the best equilibrium coincide and have maximal ASU, i.e., equal to 1. On the
other hand, we show that efficiency of the worst PNE depends on pi only through its mean.
The same analysis is performed for the case in which pi is the Dirac mass at p ∈ (0, 1), which
corresponds to i.i.d. payoffs.
Finally we deal with a model where the dependence within the profile depends on a single pa-
rameter q and perform the same asymptotic analysis as a function of p and q.
For each of these models we analyze the behavior of the best and worst equilibria as a function
of the relevant parameters, showing some interesting irregularities.
The techniques we use in this paper are standard in the probabilistic literature, and amount
mostly to first and second moment analysis, large deviations and calculus. Nonetheless, a refined
analysis of a perturbation of the large deviation rate of binomial random variables is required to
provide precise asymptotic results on the phase-transition mentioned in the abstract.
1.2. Related literature. The distribution of the number of PNE in games with random payoffs
has been studied for a number of years. Many papers assume the random payoffs to be i.i.d. from
a continuous distribution. Under this hypothesis, several papers studied the asymptotic behavior
of random games, as the number of strategies grows. For instance, Goldman (1957) showed that
in zero-sum two-person games the probability of having a PNE goes to zero. He also briefly dealt
with the case of payoffs with a Bernoulli distribution. Goldberg et al. (1968) studied general two-
person games and showed that the probability of having at least one PNE converges to 1 − e−1.
Dresher (1970) generalized this result to the case of an arbitrary finite number of players. Other
papers have looked at the asymptotic distribution of the number of PNE, again when the number
of strategies diverges. Powers (1990) showed that, when the number of strategies of at least two
players goes to infinity, the distribution of the number of PNE converges to a Poisson(1). She then
compared the case of continuous and discontinuous distributions. Stanford (1995) derived an exact
formula for the distribution of PNE in random games and obtained the result in Powers (1990) as a
corollary. Stanford (1996) dealt with the case of two-person symmetric games and obtained Poisson
convergence for the number of both symmetric and asymmetric PNE.
In all the above models, the expected number of PNE is in fact 1. Under different hypotheses,
this expected number diverges. For instance, Stanford (1997, 1999) showed that this is the case for
games with vector payoffs and for games of common interest, respectively. Rinott and Scarsini (2000)
weakened the hypothesis of i.i.d. payoffs; that is, they assumed that payoff vectors corresponding
to different strategy profiles are i.i.d., but they allowed some dependence within the same payoff
vector. In this setting, they proved asymptotic results when either the number of players or the
number of strategies diverges. More precisely, if each payoff vector has a multinormal exchangeable
distribution with correlation coefficient ρ, then, if ρ is positive, the number of PNE diverges and a
central limit theorem holds. Raič (2003) used Chen-Stein method to bound the distance between
the distribution of the normalized number of PNE and a normal distribution. His result is very
2
general, since it does not assume continuity of the payoff distributions. Takahashi (2008) considered
the distribution of the number of PNE in a random game with two players, conditionally on the
game having nondecreasing best-response functions. This assumption greatly increases the expected
number of PNE. Daskalakis et al. (2011) extended the framework of games with random payoffs
to graphical games. Strategy profiles are vertices of a graph and players’ strategies are binary, like
in our model. Moreover, their payoff depends only on their strategy and the strategies of their
neighbors. The authors studied how the structure of the graph affects existence of PNE and they
examined both deterministic and random graphs. Amiet et al. (2019) showed that in games with
n players and two actions for each player, the key quantity that determines the behavior of the
number of PNE is the probability that two different payoffs assume the same value. They then
studied the behavior of best-response dynamics in random games.
The issue of solution concepts in games with random payoffs has been explored by various authors
in different directions. For instance, Cohen (1998) studied the probability that Nash equilibria (both
pure and mixed) in a finite random game maximize the sum of the players’ payoffs. This bears some
relation with what we do in this paper.
The fact that selfish behavior of agents produces inefficiencies goes back at least to Pigou (1920)
and has been studied in various fashions in the economic literature. Measuring inefficiency of
equilibria in games has attracted the interest of the algorithmic-game-theory community around
the change of the millennium. Efficiency of equilibria is typically measured using either the PoA
or the PoS. The PoA, i.e., the ratio of the optimum SU over the SU of the worst equilibrium,
was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and given this name by Papadimitriou
(2001b). The PoS, i.e., the ratio of the optimum SU over the SU of the best equilibrium, was
introduced by Schulz and Stier Moses (2003) and given this name by Anshelevich et al. (2008). The
reader is referred for instance to Roughgarden and Tardos (2007) for the basic concepts related to
inefficiency of equilibria.
1.2.1. Connections with random Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSP) and partially-oriented per-
colation. A CSP amounts to find an initialization for a set of n variables taking value in a finite
alphabet, say {0, 1}, subject to a certain number of constraints. Example of problems in this class
are classical in the computer science literature, e.g. SAT, graph coloring, independent set, etc. See,
among others, Coja-Oghlan (2009), Mezard and Montanari (2009). Clearly, a binary game can be
phrased as a CSP by considering pure Nash equilibria as the solution concept.
Random CSP have attracted at lot of attention in the physics community, where a number of
deep conjectures on the behavior of the solution set have been developed, and only part of them
have been recently rigorously proved by mathematicians (see, e.g., Achlioptas and Peres (2004),
Abbe and Montanari (2014), Ding et al. (2015)). Given a law on the space of instances of a CSP,
the first problem lies in the analysis of the size of the solution set, which is a random subset of
{0, 1}n.
In Amiet et al. (2019) the authors noticed that a random binary game can be phrased as a
marked partially oriented percolation on the hypercube. Strategy profiles represent vertices of the
hypercube, each vertex has an array mark, which corresponds to the utilities of the players under
the corresponding strategy profile. We place an oriented arc between two profiles if and only if they
are neighbors in the hypercube and the mark in the differing coordinate is strictly larger in the
arrival vertex. In this framework, the set of Nash equilibria coincide with the set of vertices having
out-degree equal to zero, i.e., sinks.
In the physicists’ language, in Amiet et al. (2019) the authors computed the quenched free-energy
of the model, see Eq. (2.20). In this work we consider a closely related CSP, in which we enlarge
the set of constraints: a “solution” is a pure Nash equilibrium with a certain social utility. In the
percolation representation of the problem, we aim at controlling the number of sinks with a given
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sum of the entries in the mark. We will see how this additional constraint affects the free-energy
and, in general, we refine the analysis of the solution set in Amiet et al. (2019) under the binary-
payoff assumption. We stress that, by our analysis, in the case of binary random games a “vanilla”
second-moment argument (see Achlioptas and Peres (2004)) is sufficient to control the quenched
free-energy of the random CSP.
1.3. Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted
to a second moment analysis under no assumption on the distribution F . In section Sections 3–5
we present a precise analysis of the efficiency of equilibria for three different specific choices for F .
Finally, Section 6 is devoted to proofs.
2. General model
We consider a game with n players. We use the symbol [n] for the set of players. Each player can
choose one action in {0, 1}. Then the set Σ of strategy profiles is the Cartesian product ×i∈[n]{0, 1}.
As usual, the symbol ⊕ will denote the binary XOR operator, defined as
(2.1) 1⊕ 0 = 0⊕ 1 = 1, 0⊕ 0 = 1⊕ 1 = 0.
Therefore, ⊕-adding 1 changes one action into the other. Moreover, for every s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Σ
we let the symbol s−i denote the strategy profile in which the action of player i is unspecified, so
that s = (s−i, si), for all s ∈ Σ and i ∈ [n].
Let NE denote the set of Nash equilibria, i.e.,
(2.2) NE := {s ∈ Σ | ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1), ∀i ∈ [n]} .
For i ∈ [n], ui : Σ→ R denotes player i’s payoff function. We further assume that the payoffs are
binary, in the sense that
(2.3) ui(s) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [n], ∀s ∈ Σ.
We will refer to such games with the name of binary games.
We will be interested in the behavior of the following quantities:
social utility (SU) SU(s) :=
∑
i∈[n]
ui(s),(2.4)
average social utility (ASU) ASU(s) := 1n SU(s).(2.5)
In particular, we will focus on the extremes of the social utility, in the sense that we consider the
following objects
social utility of the socially optimum (SO) SO(s) := max
s∈Σ
SU(s),(2.6)
social utility of the best equilibrium (BEq) Beq(s) := max
s∈NE
SU(s),(2.7)
social utility of the worst equilibrium (WEq) Weq(s) := min
s∈NE
SU(s).(2.8)
In what follows, we will consider binary games with random payoffs. More precisely, for every choice
of n ∈ N we will consider a probability measure on the set of binary games with n players as follows.
Consider a random potential function, Φ : Σ→ [0, 1], such that
(2.9)
(
Φ(s)
)
s∈Σ, i.i.d. Φ(s) ∼ pi,
for some probability measure pi with supp(pi) ⊆ [0, 1]. Notice that considering the common-interests
game with payoffs
(2.10) ui(s) = Φ(s), ∀i ∈ [n], ∀s ∈ Σ
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we have a potential game. In our model, instead, we consider a discrete perturbation of the potential
structure, in the sense that we use the potential Φ just to model dependences between payoffs of
different players under the same profile. More precisely, given the value of the potential at a given
profile s, i.e. Φ(s), the utility of the players are n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables of parameter
Φ(s). Moreover, we assume independence of payoffs vectors under different profiles.
We will call p = E[Φ(s)]. Notice that, marginally,
(2.11) P(ui(s) = 1) = p.
Eq. (2.11) implies that the marginal distribution of the payoffs does not depend on the specific
choice of pi, but only on its expectation.
In the following section we will present precise results concerning three specific but significant
examples:
• Fully supported potential: pi is fully supported in the whole interval [0, 1].
• Dirac potential: pi is the Dirac mass at p. Notice that in this case the sequence (ui(s))i∈[n],s∈Σ
is i.i.d.. For this reason we will refer to this model as the independent case.
• Dichotomous potential: For some q ∈ [0, 1], pi is the convex combination of two Dirac
masses, i.e., for every I ⊆ [0, 1],
(2.12) pi(I) = (1− p)δ(1−q)p(I) + pδq+(1−q)p(I).
Notice that if q = 0 we are back to the independent case, while if q = 1 we have a.s. a
common-interests game.
We stress that an interpolation of the techniques used in what follows are in principle sufficient to
study the general model with arbitrary distribution of the potential. In fact, in this first section we
will investigate the first and the second moment of the set of solutions, i.e., the set of equilibria,
without any assumption on the measure pi. As we will see, the expected number of equilibria
grows exponentially with the number of players, regardless of the specific form of pi. Moreover, the
independence of the payoffs across different profiles is sufficient to ensure that the random number
of equilibria is well approximated by its expectation.
Proposition 1. For any probability measure pi with mean p we have
(2.13) E[|NE |] =
∫ 1
0
(2− 2p(1− x))n dpi(x),
and
(2.14) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log E [|NE |] ≥ log 3
2
.
Proposition 2. For any probability measure pi we have
(2.15) lim
n→∞
E[|NE |2]
E[|NE |]2 = 1.
The next corollary follows immediately by Chebyshev’s inequality and Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. For any probability measure pi, if exists some c ∈ [log(3/2), log(2)] such that
(2.16) lim
n→∞
1
n
log E [|NE |] = c,
then
(2.17)
1
n
log |NE | P−→ c.
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For the independent model Eq. (2.13) reads
(2.18) E[|NE |] = (1 + α(p))n,
where
(2.19) α(p) := p2 + (1− p)2 ≥ 1
2
.
In fact, the independent model is a particular instance of the more general one introduced in Amiet
et al. (2019), where the authors show that
(2.20) 1n log |NE |
P−→ log(1 + α(p)).
In fact, the analogue of Eq. (2.20) can be proved for other models, as it is stated by Eq. (2.17).
The same phenomenon occurs for the set of equilibria with a certain social utility, as soon as the
expected size of this set grows exponentially in n. More precisely, if we call
(2.21) Wk = {s ∈ Σ | SU(s) = k} , Zk = {s ∈ NE | SU(s) = k} ⊂Wk,
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3. Let Q = |Zk| or Q = |Wk| for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Then, for any probability
measure pi for which
(2.22) lim
n→∞
1
n
log E [Q] = c > 1,
we have
(2.23) lim
n→∞
E[Q2]
E[Q]2
= 1,
and, consequently,
(2.24)
1
n
logQ
P−→ c.
3. Fully supported potential
In this section we focus on the case in which pi is fully supported in [0, 1]. We will show that,
under this assumption, the number of equilibria grows at the maximal possible rate.
Theorem 1 (Number of equilibria and typical efficiency). If pi is fully supported in [0, 1], then
(3.1) lim
n→∞
1
n
log |NE | P−→ log 2.
Moreover, if N̂Eε is the set of equilibria having average social utility greater than 1− ε, then for all
ε > 0,
(3.2) lim
n→∞
|N̂Eε|
|NE |
P−→ 1.
Notice that when ui(s) = 1 for all i then the profile s is automatically a pure equilibrium. On
the other hand, if the social utility of s is xn for some x ∈ (0, 1), then the probability that s is an
equilibrium is exponentially small, with a rate depending only on x and p, more precisely,
(3.3) P (s ∈ NE | SU(s) = xn) =
[
(1− p)(1−x)
]n
.
The rationale underlying Theorem 1 is that—given that pi is fully supported—for all ε > 0 there
exists a fraction δ of strategy profiles with average social utility larger than 1−ε. For those profiles,
the probability of being an equilibrium has a small exponential cost. In other words, the proof of
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Theorem 1 shows that in this framework best equilibria are optimal and have average social utility
equal to 1. Moreover, most of the equilibria share this property.
On the other hand, for the behavior of the worst equilibria, we need to analyze the exponential
rate in Eq. (3.3). The following Theorem 2 shows that, if p < 12 , then arbitrary bad equilibria exist.
On the other hand, if p is sufficiently large, the worst equilibria have a typical average social utility,
which depends only on p.
Theorem 2. If pi is fully supported in [0, 1] , then
(3.4)
1
n
(SO,Beq,Weq)
P−→ (1, 1, h(p)) ,
where h : (0, 1)→ [0, 1] is the non-decreasing continuous function defined as
(3.5) h(p) :=
{
0 if p ≤ 12 ,
log(2(1−p))
log(1−p) if p >
1
2 .
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0.2
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Figure 1. Plot of the function h(p) defined in Eq. (3.5).
4. Independent payoffs
In this section we analyze the independent model which, as mentioned above, is a particular
instance of the model in Amiet et al. (2019). In this framework, the study of the behavior of the
random variable SO is somehow classical in the probabilistic literature. In fact, the latter can be
thought of as the maximum of 2n independent random variables with law Bin(n, p). Therefore, the
analysis of SO relies on the study of the large deviation rate of a sequence of Binomial trials and
has been performed in details, e.g., in Durrett (1979). Clearly, when one focuses on Beq (Weq)
the analysis is more complicated, due to the fact that dependencies arise when restricting the
maximization (minimization) to the random domain NE. In this context, the behavior of Beq and
Weq can be determined by a precise analysis of the interplay of two different factors: the exponential
cost needed to have a large average social utility (i.e., equal to some x > p) and the exponential
cost of being an equilibrium given an average social utility equal to x. Such a competition realizes
in the phenomena described in the forthcoming Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 3 (Convergence). There exists three explicit functions
(4.1) xopt, xbeq, xweq : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
such that
(4.2)
1
n
(
SO,Beq,Weq
) P−→ (xopt(p), xbeq(p), xweq(p)).
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Figure 2. Numerical approximation of the functions defined in Eq. (4.1). In blue: xopt(p).
In orange: xbeq(p). In green: xweq(p).
The limit quantities for SO, Beq and Weq—seen as a functions of p—display an interesting be-
havior. In particular, there exists some threshold for the value of p before/after which the functions
stay constant.
Theorem 4 (Phase transitions). The functions xopt and xbeq are both increasing on the interval
(0, 1/2) and are identically equal to 1 on the interval [1/2, 1].
The function xweq is identically 0 on the interval (0, 1−
√
2/2) and is increasing on the interval
[1−√2/2, 1].
We stress that in this model efficiency can always be “nearly achieved” at equilibrium, in the
sense that the ratio xopt/xbeq is near 1 for all the value of p ∈ (0, 1), see Fig. 2.
Notice that by choosing p = 1/2 we are considering the uniform measure on the space of binary
games with n players. In other words, properties that hold with high probability in the model with
potential distribution pi(·) = δ1/2(·) are shared by a fraction of binary games that approaches 1 as n
grows to infinity. Therefore, if p = 12 , we can rephrase Theorem 4 as a counting problem and obtain
the following result.
Corollary 2. For all ε > 0 consider the set Gn of all the binary games with n players and the subset
G˜n,ε of binary games having SO,Beq ∈ [1 − ε, 1] and Weq ∈ [xweq(1/2) − ε, xweq(1/2) + ε]. Then,
for all ε > 0,
lim
n→∞
|G˜n,ε|
|Gn| = 1.
Roughly, Corollary 2 states that asymptotically almost every binary game has
PoS ≈ 1 and PoA ≈ 4.4034.
5. Underlying dichotomous potential
We now consider the dichotomous potential case, which can be equivalently defined as follows.
For every s ∈ Σ consider an auxiliary sequence of random variables (X(s))s∈Σ i.i.d. Bern(p), a
sequence (Ri(s))i∈[n],s∈Σ of i.i.d. Bern(q) and, finally, a sequence (Yi(s))i∈[n],s∈Σ of i.i.d. Bern(p).
Moreover, we assume all these sequences to be independent. We then define the game as follows:
(5.1) ui(s) =
{
X(s) if Ri(s) = 1
Yi(s) if Ri(s) = 0
, ∀s ∈ Σ, ∀i ∈ [n].
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Roughly, with probability q the payoff of player i under s copies the random potential X(s), while,
with the remaining probability, it is an independent Bern(p) random variable.
Our next theorem shows that the exponential size of |NE | increases monotonically with the corre-
lation parameter q. Moreover, asymptotically the efficiency of almost every equilibrium corresponds
to the value that optimizes the competition of the exponential costs mentioned in Section 4. We will
give an explicit expression for this value and we will show that it is increasing in q for every fixed
p ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the presence of correlation not only increases the number of Nash equilibria,
but also their typical efficiency.
Theorem 5 (Number of equilibria and typical efficiency). For all (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], we have
(5.2)
1
n
log |NE | P−→ log (1 + α(p) + 2qp(1− p)).
Moreover, given any ε > 0 and defining
(5.3) N̂Eε =
{
s ∈ NE : ∣∣ 1n SU(s)− x+(p, q)∣∣ < ε} ,
where
(5.4) x+(p, q) =
q + p(1− q)
1− p(1− q) + p2(1− q) ,
we have
(5.5)
|N̂Eε|
|NE |
P−→ 1.
Remark 1. Since x+(1/2, 0) = 2/3, an immediate consequence of Theorem 5 is that, in the same
spirit of Corollary 2, a uniformly sampled equilibrium in a uniformly random binary game has an
average social utility of 2/3.
We will now establish the analogue of Theorem 3 for the general model with q ≥ 0. Notice that
the limit functions in this case depend on the interplay of the two parameters p and q.
Theorem 6 (Convergence). There exists three functions
(5.6) xopt, xbeq, xweq : (0, 1)× [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
such that
(5.7)
1
n
(
SO,Beq,Weq
) P−→ (xopt(p, q), xbeq(p, q), xweq(p, q)).
Given Eq. (5.7), it is natural to analyze the behavior of the limit quantities as functions of the
two parameters p and q, in the same vein of Theorem 4. In this case, we will fix the parameter
p ∈ (0, 1) and vary the correlation parameter q ∈ [0, 1]. We now show that these functions exhibit
different kinds of irregularity depending on the choice of p.
Theorem 7 (Phase transitions). For all (p, q) ∈ (0, 1)×[0, 1] the function xweq(p, q) has the following
properties
(i) If p ∈ [0, 1− √22 ], then xweq(p, q) = 0 for every q ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) If p ∈ [1− √22 , 12], then xweq(p, ·) is continuous in [0, 1]. Moreover, calling
(5.8) ρ(p) :=
4p− 2p2 − 1
2(1− p)p ,
xweq(p, ·) ∈ C1
(
(0, ρ(p))
)
with
(5.9)
d
dq
xweq(p, q) < 0,
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Figure 3. The figures represent numerical approximations of xopt(p, q) (blue), xbeq(p, q)
(orange) and xweq(p, q) (green) as function of q, when p = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.75, respectively.
In third picture, the vertical segment around x ≈ 0.7 is the discontinuous jump mentioned
in Theorem 7.
and xweq(q, p) = 0 for every q > ρ(p).
(iii) If p > 12 , xweq(p, q) > 0 for every q ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) There exist some critical pc ∈ (1/2, 1) (pc ≈ 0.732) such that
• If p ∈ (pc, 1), then xweq(p, q) is continuous for q ∈ [0, 1].
• If p ∈ (1/2, pc), then xweq(p, q) is continuous for q ∈ [0, 1] \ {q∗(p)}, where
(5.10) q∗(p) :=
1− 2p+ 2p2
2p2
.
Moreover,
(5.11) lim
q↑q∗(p)
xweq(p, q) < lim
q↓q∗(p)
xweq(p, q).
As we remarked above, in the independent model the efficiency is approximatively achieved at
equilibrium, in the sense that, for all p ∈ (0, 1), xopt and xbeq are not far apart. The following
proposition shows that the same is true in the model with dependent payoffs.
Proposition 4. For all p, q ∈ (0, 1) the functions xopt(p, q) and xbeq(p, q) satisfy,
(5.12) xopt(p, q) = xopt(q + (1− q)p, 0), xbeq(p, q) ≥ xbeq(q + (1− q)p, 0).
6. Proofs
In this section we present the main proofs of the results of Sections 2–5. In particular, in Sec-
tion 6.1 we deal with the moments results in Section 2. In Section 6.2 we prove the convergences
in Theorems 3 and 6. In Section 6.2 we prove the phase transition outlined in Theorems 4 and 7.
Finally, in Section 6.3 we will prove the results in Section 3.
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We will adopt the following notation. For every n ∈ N,
(
Ω(n),P
(n)
pi
)
denotes the probability
space introduced above, where pi is the probability law of the potential and n is number of players.
Since we are interested in the asymptotic scenario in which the number of players grows to infinity,
we will usually drop the dependence on n in the notation. Moreover, when the choice of pi is
clear by the context, we will also drop the dependence on F . We say that a sequence of real
random variables (Xn)n∈N in the product probability space ×n∈N
(
Ω(n),P
(n)
pi
)
converges to ` ∈ R in
probability (denoted by Xn
P−→ `), if
(6.1) ∀ε > 0, lim
n→∞P
(n)
pi
(∣∣Xn − `∣∣ < ε) = 1.
6.1. Moments estimates. We start the subsection by proving Proposition 1, namely the expected
size of the set of equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by computing the probability that a given profile s is an equilib-
rium by conditioning on the value of the potential at s, namely
P (s ∈ NE) =
∫ 1
0
P (s ∈ NE | Φ(s) = x) dF (x)(6.2)
=
∫ 1
0
[1− p(1− x)]n dF (x),(6.3)
(6.4)
where we used the fact that
P (s ∈ NE | Φ(s) = x) =P (6 ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. ui(s) = 0, ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1) = 1)(6.5)
=
∏
i∈[n]
(
1− P (ui(s) = 0, ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1) = 1)
)
(6.6)
= [1− P (u1(s) = 0, u1(s−1, s1 ⊕ 1) = 1)]n(6.7)
= [1− p(1− x)]n .(6.8)
Therefore, by the linearity of the expectation,
(6.9) E[|NE |] = 2nP (s ∈ NE) ,
from which the first part of the thesis follows. Notice that, regardless of the specific choice of p the
expected number of equilibria grows exponentially in n. In fact, by the fact that pi has mean p,
there exists some ε > 0 such that P(Φ(s) ≥ p) > ε. Then
E [|NE |] =
∫ 1
0
(2− 2p(1− x))n dpi(x)(6.10)
≥
∫ 1
p
(2− 2p(1− x))n dpi(x)(6.11)
≥ε (2− 2p(1− p))n(6.12)
≥ε
(
3
2
)n
.(6.13)
Hence,
(6.14) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log E [|NE |] ≥ log 3
2
.

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Proof of Propositions 2 and 3. We now aim at computing the second moment of the quantities |Zk|,
|Wk| and |NE |. We start the proof with the analysis of the second moment of |Wk|, which is easier
to compute. Indeed, for every distinct s, s′ ∈ Σ, thanks to the independence of the payoffs vector
across profile, we have
(6.15) P(s, s′ ∈Wk) = P(s ∈Wk)2.
Therefore,
E[|Wk|]2 ≤ E[|Wk|2] =
∑
s∈Σ
∑
s′∈Σ
P(s, s′ ∈Wk)(6.16)
=
∑
s∈Σ
P(s ∈Wk) +
∑
s∈Σ
∑
s′ 6=s
P(s ∈Wk)2(6.17)
≤E[|Wk|] + E[|Wk|]2.(6.18)
In particular, if there exists some subset of values k ∈ [n] and some ε > 0 for which
(6.19) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log E[|Wk|] ≥ 1 + ε,
then Eqs. (6.16) and (6.19) ensure that for those k’s the following asymptotic estimate holds
(6.20)
E[|Wk|2]
E[|Wk|]2 ≥ 1−
1
(1 + ε)n
.
The above argument fails if the Wk is replaced by its subset Zk. This is due to the fact that
(6.21) P(s, s′ ∈ Zk) 6= P(s ∈ Zk)2.
Since the proof is identical for both |Zk| and |NE |, we will prove the lemma using |Zk|. The proof
for |NE | is similar.
We claim that for every s, s′ differing in at least three strategies, the events {s ∈ Zk} and
{s′ ∈ Zk} are independent. We notice that the event {s ∈ Zk} is measurable with respect to the
σ-field
(6.22) σ
({ui(s)}, {ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1)} : i ∈ [n]).
We remark that in the independent case, i.e., pi(·) = δp(·), if s′ differs from s in at least two strategies
we have that the events {s ∈ Zk} and {s′ ∈ Zk} are measurable with respect to independent σ-fields,
hence they are independent. On the other hand, in the general case, the events {s ∈ Zk}, {s′ ∈ Zk}
are still measurable with respect to the σ-fields of the type in Eq. (6.22), nonetheless, if s, s′ differ in
a only one or two strategies, such σ-fields are not independent. Notice that, in particular, {s ∈ Zk}
is measurable with respect to the σ-field generated by the complete information about the payoffs
of all the players in the neighboring profiles, i.e.,
(6.23) σ
({ui(s)}, {u((s−i, si ⊕ 1))} : i ∈ [n]).
Clearly, if s, s′ differs in more than two strategies, then they are measurable with respect to inde-
pendent σ-fields, hence are independent.
We now want to upper bound the probability of the event {s, s′ ∈ Zk} when the two profiles s
and s′ differs in only one or two strategies. We start by analyzing the case in which there exists a
unique i ∈ [n] such that
(6.24) s′ =
(
s−i, si ⊕ 1
)
.
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Then,
P
(
s, s′ ∈ Zk
)
=P (s ∈ Zk)P
(
s′ ∈ Zk | s ∈ Zk
)
(6.25)
=P (s ∈ Zk)P
(
s′ ∈ Zk | ui(s′) ≤ ui(s)
)
=P (s ∈ Zk) P (s
′ ∈ Zk ∩ ui(s′) ≤ ui(s))
P (ui(s′) ≤ ui(s))
=
1
1− p(1− p)P (s ∈ Zk)P
(
s′ ∈ Zk ∩ ui(s′) = ui(s)
)
.
Notice that the probability of the intersection must satisfy, uniformly in k,
P(n)
(
s ∈ Zk ∩ ui(s′) = ui(s)
)
= (1−p)2P(n−1) (s ∈ Zk)+1k>0·p2·P(n−1) (s ∈ Zk−1) = Θ
(
P(n) (s ∈ Zk)
)
.
Hence, we can conclude that for all distinct s, s′ ∈ Σ differing in exactly one strategy, uniformly in
k,
(6.26) P
(
s, s′ ∈ Zk
)
= Θ
(
P (s ∈ Zk)2
)
.
Let us now consider the case in which s and s′ are at distance 2. In other words, assume that there
are two distinct players i and j, such that
(6.27) s′ =
(
s−ij , si ⊕ 1, sj ⊕ 1
)
.
Consider also the intermediate strategies
(6.28) s′′ :=
(
s−j , sj ⊕ 1
)
=
(
s′−i, s
′
i ⊕ 1
)
, s′′′ :=
(
s−i, si ⊕ 1
)
=
(
s′−j , s
′
j ⊕ 1
)
.
Arguing as in Eq. (6.25) we get
P
(
s, s′ ∈ Zk
)
=P (s ∈ Zk)P
(
s′ ∈ Zk | s ∈ Zk
)
(6.29)
=P (s ∈ Zk)P
(
s′ ∈ Zk | ui(s) ≥ ui(s′′′) ∩ uj(s) ≥ uj(s′′)
)
=Θ
(
P(s ∈ Zk)2
)
.(6.30)
We can now compute the second moment. Denote by N`(s) the set of strategy profiles differing
from s in exactly ` coordinates. By the asymptotic estimates in Eqs. (6.25) and (6.29) we can
conclude that there exists some constant C = C(p) > 0, such that
E[|Zk|2] =
∑
s∈Σ
∑
s′∈Σ
P
(
s, s′ ∈ Zk
)
=
∑
s∈Σ
P(s ∈ Zk) + ∑
s′∈N1(s)
P(s, s′ ∈ Zk) +
∑
s′∈N2(s)
P(s, s′ ∈ Zk) +
∑
s′∈N≥3(s)
P(s ∈ Zk)2

≤E|Zk|+ C · 2n · (n+ n(n− 1))P(s ∈ Zk)2 + 2n · (2n − n− n(n− 1)− 1)P(s ∈ Zk)2
=E|Zk|+ (1 + o(1))22nP(s ∈ Zk)2 = E|Zk|+ (1 + o(1))E[|Zk|]2.
Therefore, if lim infn→∞ 1n log E|Zk| > 1 + ε for some ε > 0,
(6.31) E[|Zk|
2]
E[|Zk|]2 ≤ 1 +
C · 2n · n2P(s ∈ Zk)2
22n · P(s ∈ Zk)2 +
1
E|Zk| ≤ 1 +
1
(1 + ε)n
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6.2. Proof of the convergence. Notice that Theorem 3 is a particular case of Theorem 6, with
q = 0. In this section we will use a unified approach, showing directly Theorem 6 and obtaining
Theorem 3 by taking q = 0. The first lemma deals with the expected size of the sets in Eq. (2.21).
We remind to the reader that the entropy of a Bernoulli(x) is defined as H : (0, 1) → (0,∞),
where
(6.32) H(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x).
The following definitions are needed.
Definition 1. Consider the following bounded analytic functions
• The function fW : (0, 1)2 → [0, 2] is defined as
fW (p, x) := 2p
x(1− p)1−xeH(x).
• The function fZ : (0, 1)2 → [0, 2] is defined as
fZ(p, x) := 2p
x(1− p)2(1−x)eH(x).
• The function gW : (0, 1)3 → [0, 2] is defined as
gW (p, q, x) := max {fW (q + (1− q)p, x), fW ((1− q)p, x)} .
• The function g+Z : (0, 1)3 → [0, 2] is defined as
g+Z (p, q, x) = fW (q + (1− q)p, x)(1− p)1−x.
• The function g−Z : (0, 1)3 → [0, 2] is defined as
g−Z (p, q, x) = fW ((1− q)p, x)(1− p)1−x.
• The function gZ : (0, 1)3 → [0, 2] is defined as
gZ(p, q, x) := (1− p)1−xgW (p, q, x) = max
{
g−Z (p, q, x), g
+
Z (p, q, x)
}
.
Remark 2. Notice that, for all (p, x) ∈ (0, 1)2
gW (p, 0, x) = fW (p, x), g
−
Z (p, 0, x) = g
+
Z (p, 0, x) = gZ(p, 0, x) = fZ(p, x).
Moreover, for all p ∈ (0, 1), the functions defined in Definition 1 admit the limits x ↑ 1 and x ↓ 0,
see Lemmas 1 and 2. Therefore, for all p ∈ (0, 1) we can extend the functions in Definition 1, as
functions of the second variable, to continuous functions in [0, 1].
The forthcoming Lemmas 1 and 2 establish some easy facts about the behavior of the functions
defined in Definition 1, which can be checked by direct computation.
Lemma 1. The functions fW and fZ have the following properties:
(i) For every p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.33)
∂
∂x
log fW (p, x) = log(η(p, x)),
where
(6.34) η(p, x) :=
p
1− p ·
1− x
x
.
Hence, fixed any p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.35)
∂
∂x
fW (p, x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = p.
Moreover,
(6.36) fW (p, p) = 2.
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(ii) For every x ∈ (0, 1)
(6.37)
∂
∂p
log fW (p, x) = τ(p, x),
where
(6.38) τ(p, x) :=
x− p
p(1− p) .
Hence, fixed any x ∈ (0, 1)
(6.39)
∂
∂p
fW (p, x) = 0 ⇐⇒ p = x.
(iii) For every p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.40) lim
x↑1
fW (p, x) = 2p, lim
x↓0
fW (p, x) = 2− 2p.
(iv) For every p, x ∈ (0, 1)
(6.41) fW (p, x) > fZ(p, x).
(v) For every p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.42)
∂
∂x
log fZ(p, x) = log (β(p, x))
where
(6.43) β(p, x) :=
p
(1− p)2 ·
1− x
x
hence, fixed any p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.44)
∂
∂x
fZ(p, x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = x̂(p) := p
1− p+ p2 ,
moreover
(6.45) fZ (p, x̂(p)) = 1 + p2 + (1− p2) =: 1 + α(p).
(vi) For every x ∈ (0, 1)
(6.46)
∂
∂p
log fZ(p, x) = υ(p, x),
where
(6.47) υ(p, x) :=
x− p(2− x)
p(1− p) .
Hence, fixed any x ∈ (0, 1)
(6.48)
∂
∂p
fZ(p, x) = 0 ⇐⇒ p = x
2− x.
(vii) For every p ∈ (0, 1)
(6.49) lim
x↓0
fZ(p, x) = 2(1− p)2, lim
x↑1
fZ(p, x) = 2p.
Lemma 2. The functions g+Z (p, q, x) and g
−
Z (p, q, x), defined in Definition 1, have the following
properties:
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(a) For every p, q ∈ (0, 1)
∂
∂x
log g+Z (p, q, x) = log(β+(p, q, x)),
∂
∂x
log g−Z (p, q, x) = log(β−(p, q, x))(6.50)
where
(6.51) β+(p, q, x) :=
q + (1− q)p
(1− p)2(1− q) ·
1− x
x
, β−(p, q, x) :=
(1− q)p
(1− p)(1− p(1− q)) ·
1− x
x
.
(b) For all p, q ∈ (0, 1) there exists two points
(6.52) x+(p, q) :=
q + p(1− q)
1− p(1− q) + p2(1− q) , x
−(p, q) :=
p(1− q)
1− p+ p2(1− q)
such that
(6.53)
∂
∂x
g±Z (x)

> 0 if x < x±(p, q),
= 0 if x = x±(p, q),
< 0 if x > x±(p, q).
(c) For every p, q, x ∈ (0, 1)
∂
∂q
log g+Z (p, q, x) =
q + p(q − 1) + x
(q − 1)(p(q − 1) + q) ,
(6.54)
∂
∂q
log g−Z (p, q, x) =
p(q − 1) + x
(q − 1)(p(q − 1) + 1) .
Moreover,
(6.55)
∂
∂q
g±Z (p, q, x)

> 0 if x < υ±(p, x),
= 0 if x = υ±(p, x),
< 0 if x > υ±(p, x),
where
(6.56) υ−(p, x) :=
p− x
p
, υ+(p, x) :=
x− p
1− p .
(d) For every p, q ∈ (0, 1)
(6.57) g+Z (p, q, x)

< g−Z (p, q, x) if x < γ(p, q),
> g−Z (p, q, x) if x = γ(p, q),
> g−Z (p, q, x) if x > γ(p, q),
where,
(6.58) γ(p, q) :=
log θ1(p, q)
log θ2(p, q)
,
(6.59) θ1(p, q) :=
(1− p)(1− q)
1− p(1− q) , θ2(p, q) := θ1(p, q)
p(1− q)
q − p(1− q) .
(e) For every p, q ∈ (0, 1)
(6.60) lim
x↓0
g−Z (p, q, x) = 2(1− p)(1− p(1− q)), limx↓0 g
+
Z (p, q, x) = 2(1− p)2(1− q),
and
(6.61) lim
x↑1
g−Z (p, q, x) = 2p(1− q), limx↑1 g
+
Z (p, q, x) = 2
(
q + p(1− q)).
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Remark 3. Notice that if q = 0 we are back to the independent case, indeed g±Z (p, 0, x) = fZ(p, x)
for every p, x ∈ (0, 1) and
β±(p, 0, x) =
p
(1− p)2 ·
1− x
x
, x±(p, 0) =
p
1− p+ p2 g
±
Z (p, 0, x
±(p, 0)) = 1 + α(p).
Lemma 3. For all (p, q) ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 1), ε > 0, k ∈ [εn, (1− ε)n] we have
(6.62)
1
n
log E|Wk| ∼ log gW
(
p, q, kn
)
,
1
n
log E|Zk| ∼ log gZ
(
p, q, kn
)
.
Proof of Lemma 3. By independence of payoffs under different strategy profile, we have
E[|Wk|] =2nP(s ∈Wk)
=2n · [p · P (Bin(n, q + (1− q)p) = k) + (1− p) · P (Bin(n, (1− q)p) = k)]
=p · 2n ·
((
n
k
)
(q + (1− q)p)k(1− q − (1− q)p)n−k
)
+
+ (1− p) · 2n ·
((
n
k
)
((1− q)p)k(1− (1− q)p)n−k
)
,
where, to get the second equality, we conditioned on the outcome of X(s), defined at the beginning
of Section 5.
Fix ε > 0, and pick some k ∈ [εn, (1 + ε)n]. Let x = kn , and notice that using the asymptotic
approximation
(6.63)
(
n
xn
)
= e(1+o(1))H(x)n,
we can estimate
E[|Wk|] =p ·
[
(1 + o(1))2eH(x)(q + (1− q)p)x (1− q − (1− q)p)1−x
]n
+(6.64)
+ (1− p) ·
[
(1 + o(1))2eH(x)((1− q)p)x (1− (1− q)p)1−x
]n
=p · [(1 + o(1))fW (q + (1− q)p, x)]n + (1− p) · [(1 + o(1))fW ((1− q)p, x)]n.
Notice that the convex coefficients p and 1−p are absorbed in the (1+o(1)) error within the squared
brackets. Hence, if k ∈ [εn, (1− ε)n] for any ε > 0,
E[|Wk|] =[(1 + o(1)) max{fW (q + (1− q)p, kn), fW ((1− q)p)}]n.
By taking the logarithm and normalizing,
(6.65)
1
n
log E|Wk| ∼ max{log fW (q + (1− q)p, kn), log fW ((1− q)p, kn)}.
We now compute the expected size of Zk. By conditioning on the social utility of the profile s ∈ Σ
E[|Zk|] =2nP(s ∈ Zk)
=2nP(s ∈ NE | s ∈Wk)P(s ∈Wk).
Notice that, conditioning on any ω ∈ {s ∈ Wk}, the probability that s is an equilibrium is exactly
the probability of the event
(6.66) {ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1) = 0, ∀i s.t. ui(s) = 0} .
By the independence across i’s in the events in Eq. (6.66), we conclude that
(6.67) P
 ⋂
i : ui(s)=0
ui(s−i, si ⊕ 1) = 0
∣∣ s ∈Wk
 = (1− p)n−k.
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Hence, using the same argument as in Eq. (6.64),
E[|Zk|] =2n · (1− p)n−k · [p · P (Bin(n, q + (1− q)p) = k) + (1− p) · P (Bin(n, (1− q)p) = k)]
=
[
(1 + o(1)) max{g−Z (p, q, kn), g+Z (p, q, kn)}
]n
.
Therefore, if k ∈ [εn, (1− ε)n] for any ε > 0,
1
n
log E [|Zk|] ∼ max{log g−Z (p, q, kn), log g+Z (p, q, kn)}. 
We can use the result in Lemma 3 to show Theorem 5, which controls the number and typical
efficiency of equilibria.
Proof of Theorem 5. In order to compute the expectation of |NE | it is sufficient to notice that
P (s ∈ NE) =p P (s ∈ NE | X(s) = 1) + (1− p) P (s ∈ NE | X(s) = 0)(6.68)
=p (1− p(1− q)(1− p))n + (1− p) (1− p(q + (1− q)(1− p))n.(6.69)
Therefore
E[|NE |] = 2nP (s ∈ NE) =p [2 (1− p(1− q)(1− p))]n (1 + o(1))(6.70)
=p [1 + α(p) + 2qp(1− p)]n(6.71)
=Ω ((3/2)n)(6.72)
Therefore, by Proposition 2, |NE |/E[|NE |] P−→ 1, and by Eq. (6.70) we get Eq. (5.2). At this point,
in order to show the validity of Eq. (5.5) it is sufficient to notice that for every sufficiently small
ε > 0
1 <
1
n
log
(
E[|NE \N̂Eε|]
)
< log (1 + α(p) + 2qp(1− p))
and again by Proposition 2, |N̂Eε|/E[|N̂Eε|] P−→ 1. 
Notice that if there exists some δ > 0 such that gW (p, q, k/n) ≥ 1 + δ then the expectation
E|Wk| = ω(1), while if gW (p, q, k/n) ≤ 1 − δ then the expectation E|Wk| = o(1). The main idea
of the proof of Theorem 6 goes as follows. If for some triple (p, q, x) we have gZ(p, q, x) < 1, then
by Markov’s inequality we can infer that asymptotically there are no Nash equilibria with average
social utility x + o(1). On the other hand, if gZ(p, q, x) > 1, the set of equilibria with average
social utility x + o(1) is not empty; this will be proved by the control on the second moments in
Proposition 3.
We start by using Lemma 3 to control the probability that the set Zk is empty. As remarked
above, for every k that is not too close to 0 or n, the expectation of |Zk| is exponential of rate
gNE(p, q, k/n) ∈ [0, 2]. Hence, in what follows we will be interested in studying the solution of the
following equations
(6.73) gW (p, q, x) = 1 and gZ(p, q, x) = 1.
See Figs. 4 and 5 for a representation of the functions gW (p, q, x) and gZ(p, q, x) as a function of
the variable x for some fixed values of p and q.
For instance, when q = 0, for every given p ∈ (0, 1), the smallest x for which fZ(p, x) ≥ 1 is our
proxy for the ASU of the worst equilibrium, while the largest x for which fZ(p, x) ≥ 1 is our proxy
for the ASU of the best equilibrium. Similarly, the optimum ASU can be obtained by looking at
the largest x for which fW (p, x) ≥ 1. We formalize this intuition in the following proposition, which
is the technical version of the more readable Theorem 6.
Proposition 5. Fix p, q ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 1) and any ε, δ > 0.
18
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Figure 4. In Blue: fZ(p, x) as function of x. In Orange: fW (p, x) as function of x. The
value of p in the four pictures is, respectively, p = 0.25, 1 −√2/2, 0.4. The green line is at
height 1.
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Figure 5. Plot of the functions gW (0.5, 0.75, x) (in orange) and gZ(0.5, 0.75, x) (in blue).
The fact that the orange curve lies above the line at height one, means that the expectation
of the number of strategy with SU k diverges exponentially fast, for all k ∈ [0, n]. On the
other hand, the regions where the blue curve lies below the green line denotes values of ASU
which will not appear within the strategies in NE.
(a) Call
N+ε,δ :={k ∈ [δn, (1− δ)n] : gW
(
p, q, kn
) ≥ 1 + ε},(6.74)
N−ε,δ :={k ∈ [δn, (1− δ)n] : gW
(
p, q, kn
) ≤ 1− ε},(6.75)
we have
lim
n→∞P
( ∪k∈N−ε,δ Wk = ∅) = 1, limn→∞P(∀k ∈ N+ε,δ, Wk 6= ∅) = 1.(6.76)
(b) Called
M+ε,δ :={k ∈ [δn, (1− δ)n] : gZ
(
p, q, kn
) ≥ 1 + ε},(6.77)
M−ε,δ :={k ∈ [δn, (1− δ)n] : gZ
(
p, q, kn
) ≤ 1− ε},(6.78)
we have,
lim
n→∞P
( ∪k∈M−ε,δ Zk = ∅) = 1, limn→∞P(∀k ∈M+ε,δ, Zk 6= ∅) = 1.(6.79)
Proof. We prove (a); the proof of (b) is similar.
Fix a pair p, q ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 1] and ε, δ > 0. Pick some k ∈ N−ε,δ. We have
(6.80) P (|Wk| ≥ 1) ≤ E[|Wk|],
hence, for every sufficiently large n
(6.81)
1
n
logP (|Wk| ≥ 1) ≤ 1− ε,
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where the first is Markov inequality and the second estimate follows from Lemma 3 and holds
uniformly in k ∈ N−ε,δ. By applying the union bound we get the first limit in Eq. (6.76).
On the other hand, by Proposition 3 and the second moment method, (see Alon and Spencer,
2016, Ch. 4) ,
(6.82) P (Wk 6= ∅) ≥ E[|Wk|]
2
E[|Wk|2] ≥ 1−
1
(1 + ε)n
.
We can therefore deduce the second limit in Eq. (6.76) by applying a union bound over k ∈ N+ε,δ. 
The results in Theorems 3 and 6 now follow as a corollary of Proposition 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. The claim follows directly by Eqs. (6.76) and (6.79). We show the result for
the Weq, since the proofs for Beq and SO are identical. Fix ε, δ > 0. Notice that, by Eq. (6.77),
1
n mins∈NE
SU(s) = 1n min{k ∈ [n] : Zk 6= ∅} ≤ 1n min{k ∈M+ε,δ} =: 1nkε,δ
On the other hand, by Eq. (6.79), we have
(6.83) 1n min{k ∈ [n] : Zk 6= ∅} ≥ 1n max{k ∈M−ε,δ | k ≤ kε,δ} =: 1nkε,δ,
where we define kε,δ = 0 if the set in its definition is empty. By continuity of gZ(p, q, ·) and the fact
that gZ(p, q, ·) and its derivative are bounded around 0 and 1 (see Lemma 2), we have that for all
η > 0, we can find n0, ε and δ such that, for all n > n0,
(6.84)
∣∣∣∣ 1nkε,δ − 1nkε,δ∣∣∣∣ < η,
and
(6.85)
∣∣ 1
nkε,δ − inf
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : gZ(p, q, x) ≥ 1
}∣∣ < η.
Hence,
(6.86) lim
n→∞P
(∣∣ 1
n mins∈NE
SU(s)− inf {x ∈ (0, 1) : gZ(p, q, x) ≥ 1}∣∣ ≤ η) = 1,
which concludes the proof. 
As a byproduct of the above proof we get the following characterization of the limit functions
defined in Theorem 6. By Eq. (6.86), for all p, q ∈ (0, 1) × [0, 1], the function xweq defined in
Theorem 6 admits the following implicit representation
xweq(p, q) = inf{x ∈ (0, 1) : gZ(p, q, x) ≥ 1}.(6.87)
Similarly, the functions xopt and xbeq admit the representations
xopt(p, q) = sup{x ∈ (0, 1) : gW (p, q, x) ≥ 1},(6.88)
xbeq(p, q) = sup{x ∈ (0, 1) : gZ(p, q, x) ≥ 1}.(6.89)
The phase-transition in Theorem 4 is then a consequence of the analysis of the functions in
Eqs. (6.87) and (6.88), Eq. (6.89).
Proof of Theorem 4. We start by analyzing the function xopt : (0, 1/2)→ [0, 1].
By Lemma 1(iii), we have
(6.90) lim
x↑1
log fW (p, x) < 0.
This inequality, together with the continuity of fW (p, x), justifies the characterization of xopt(p) as
the largest solution in x ∈ (0, 1) of the equation
(6.91) log fW (p, x) = 0.
20
In order to use implicit function theorem, we need to check that, for every fixed p ∈ (0, 1/2), the
partial derivative with respect to x of the function fW (p, x) does not vanish at the largest solution
of Eq. (6.91). Notice that xopt(p) > p since fW (p, p) = 2. Moreover, thanks to Lemma 1(i) for every
p ∈ (0, 1/2) and x ∈ (p, 1) we have
(6.92) η(p, x) < 1 =⇒ ∂
∂x
log fW (p, x) < 0,
where η is defined as in Eq. (6.34). Relying again on the rough estimate xopt(p) > p, together with
Lemma 1(ii), we get
(6.93) τ(p, x) > 0 =⇒ ∂
∂p
log fW (p, xopt(p)) > 0,
where τ is defined as in Eq. (6.38). Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, the implicit function
xopt(p) defined by Eq. (6.91) admits, for all p ∈ (0, 1/2), derivative of the form
(6.94)
d
dp
xopt(p)
∣∣
p0
= −
∂
∂p log fW (p, x)
∣∣
p0,xopt(p0)
∂
∂x log fW (p, x)
∣∣
p0,xopt(p0)
> 0.
We proceed similarly for xbeq(p) in the same interval (0, 1/2). By Lemma 1(vii)
(6.95) lim
x↑1
log fW (p, x) < 0.
Hence, by continuity of fZ(p, x), the function xbeq(p) is defined implicitly as the largest solution in
(0, 1) of the equation
(6.96) log fZ(p, x) = 0.
Notice that, thanks to Lemma 1(v),
(6.97)
∂
∂x
log fZ(p, x) < 0, ∀x > x̂(p) := p
1− p+ p2 .
Since
(6.98) log fZ(p, x̂(p)) = log(1 + α(p)) > 0,
it holds that xbeq(p) > x̂(p). Moreover, by Lemma 1(vi), we have
(6.99)
∂
∂p
log fZ(p, x) > 0 ∀x > 2p
1 + p
.
Since
(6.100) fZ
(
p,
2p
1 + p
)
= (1 + p)(2− 2p) 2p+1−1 > 1,
we have
(6.101) xbeq >
2p
1 + p
.
In conclusion, by the implicit function theorem, the function xbeq is C1(0, 1/2) and
(6.102)
d
dp
xbeq(p)
∣∣
p0
> 0.
The behavior of the function xopt and xbeq in the interval (1/2, 1) follows by the continuity of fW
and fZ together with Lemma 1(iv) and Lemma 1(vii).
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We are left to show the regularity properties of the function xweq. If we restrict to p ∈ (1−
√
2/2, 1),
we can characterize xweq as the smallest solution in x ∈ (0, 1) of the equation in Eq. (6.96). Notice
that by Lemma 1(iii), Eq. (6.100), and the continuity of fZ(p, ·) we deduce that
(6.103) xweq(p) <
2p
1 + p
.
For the same reason, given Eq. (6.98), we have xweq(p) < p1−p+p2 . By the converse of the inequalities
in Eqs. (6.97) and (6.99), we obtain
∂
∂p
log fZ(p, x) < 0 ⇐⇒ x < 2p
1 + p
(6.104)
∂
∂x
fZ(p, x) > 0 ⇐⇒ x < p
1− p+ p2 ,(6.105)
So, we can apply the implicit function theorem and conclude that the function xweq(p) admits a
derivative
(6.106)
d
dp
xweq(p)
∣∣
p0
> 0 ∀p0 ∈ (1− 1/
√
2, 1).
To conclude, we need to show that xweq is constantly zero in the interval
(
0, 1 −
√
2
2
)
. This is just
a simple consequence of Lemma 1(vii). In fact,
lim
x↑0
log fW (p, x) > 0 ⇐⇒ p < 1−
√
2
2
. 
We are now going to prove the phase-transition phenomenon described in Theorem 7. We recall
to the reader that here we assume p to be fixed while the moving parameter is the correlation q.
Proof of Theorem 7. By steps:
(i) By Lemma 2(e) we have
(6.107) lim
x↓0
g−Z (p, q, x) = 2(1− p)(1− p(1− q)) > 1 ⇐⇒ q > ρ(p).
Notice that
(6.108) ρ(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p > 1− 1√
2
.
The result follows immediately
(ii) We note that ρ(p) : (1−1/√2, 1/2)→ (0, 1) is a bijection. Moreover, by the implicit function
theorem, for all q0 ∈ (0, ρ(p)),
d
dq
x˜weq(p, q)
∣∣
q0
=−
∂
∂q log g
−
Z (p, q, x)
∣∣
q0,x˜weq(p,q0)
∂
∂x log g
−
Z (p, q, x)
∣∣
q0,x˜weq(p,q0)
(6.109)
=− p(1− q)− x
(1− q)(1− p(1− q)) log (β−(p, q, x))
∣∣∣∣
q0,x˜weq(p,q0)
,(6.110)
where β− is defined as in Eq. (6.51). We aim at showing that the signs of numerator and
denominator in Eq. (6.110) coincide. Note that we have
(6.111) log β−(p, q, xweq(p, q)) > 0, ∀p ∈
(
1−
√
2
2 ,
1
2
)
, ∀q > ρ(p).
In fact, the sign of log β−(p, q, ·) is the sign of the partial derivative of g−Z (p, q, x) with respect
to x, which is positive at xweq(p, q). On the other hand, by definition,
(6.112) (1− q)(1− p(1− q)) > 0.
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Hence, we are left with showing that
(6.113) p(1− q)− xweq(p, q) > 0, ∀p ∈
(
1−
√
2
2 ,
1
2
)
, ∀q > ρ(p).
Since for p ∈ (1−√2/2, 1/2) the quantity xweq(p, q) is the smallest solution of the equation
(6.114) log g−Z (p, q, x) = 0,
it is sufficient to check that
(6.115) log g−Z (p, q, p(1− q)) > 0, ∀p ∈
(
1−
√
2
2 ,
1
2
)
, ∀q > ρ(p).
We can rewrite Eq. (6.115) as
(6.116) log(2) + (1− p(1− q)) log(1− p) > 0, ∀p ∈ (1− √22 , 12), ∀q > ρ(p).
Notice that the following inequality is stronger than Eq. (6.116):
(6.117) log(2) + log(1− p) > 0, ∀p ∈ (1− √22 , 12),
and the latter is trivially true.
(iii) By the same argument used to prove (i), we have
(6.118) lim
x↓0
g−Z (p, q, x) < 1 ⇐⇒ q < ρ(p).
To conclude, notice that ρ(p) > 1 if p ∈ (1/2, 1).
(iv) For every p ∈ (1/2, 1) call q∗(p) the unique solution of the equation in q
(6.119) log g−Z (p, q, x
−(p, q)) = log
(
2
(
p2(1− q) + (1− p))) = 0.
For all p ∈ (1/2, 1) the function g−Z (p, ·, x−(p, ·)) is decreasing in q ∈ (0, 1), and the unique
solution of the equation in Eq. (6.119) is given by
(6.120) q∗(p) =
1− 2p+ 2p2
2p2
, ∀p ∈ (1/2, 1).
The existence of a unique solution to Eq. (6.119) implies that, for all p ∈ (1/2), there exist
a unique value of q for which the maximum attained by the curve g−Z (p, q, ·) is exactly 1.
Having in mind the plots in Figs. 6 and 7, we are interested in understanding whether
(6.121) x−(p, q∗(p)) ≶ inf{x ∈ (0, 1) : g+Z (p, q∗(p), x) ≥ 1}.
In order to do so, we aim at analyzing the map
(6.122) p 7→ g+Z
(
p, q∗(p), x−(p, q∗(p))
)
,
namely, the value assumed by the function g+Z at the point in which the function g
−
Z attains its
maximum height, i.e., 1. We start by claiming that the function in Eq. (6.122) is increasing,
hence there exists a unique solution in (1/2, 1) of the equation in p
(6.123) g+Z
(
p, q∗(p), x−(p, q∗(p))
)
= 1.
We define pc the solution of Eq. (6.123); numerically, pc ≈ 0.731642. As suggested by the
plots in Figs. 6 and 7, we expect two different behaviors of the function xweq(p, ·) when
p ∈ (1/2, pc) (see Fig. 6), and when p ∈ (pc, 1) (see Fig. 7).
In order to show the monotonicity of the map in Eq. (6.122) it is sufficient to proceed by
explicit computation. In fact,
(6.124) log g+Z
(
p, q∗(p), x−(p, q∗(p))
)
= log
(
3− 1
p
− 2p
)
+
(
2− 1
p
)
log
(
1− (3− 4p)p
(2p− 1)2(1− p)
)
,
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Figure 6. Plot of gZ(p, q, x) (blue) and gW (p, q, x) (orange) when p = 0.6 < pc and q =
0.5, 0.68, 0.74, 0.77, respectively. Recall that gZ(p, q, x) = g−Z (p, q, x) on the left of the dashed
line x = γ(p, q), while gZ(p, q, x) = g+Z (p, q, x) on the right. Similarly gW (p, q, x) = fW ((1−
q)p, x) on the left of the dashed line, while gW (p, q, x) = fW (q + (1− q)p, x) on the right.
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Figure 7. Plot of gZ(p, q, x) (blue) and gW (p, q, x) (orange) when p = 0.8 > pc and q =
0.2, 0.45, 0.52, 0.55, respectively. The dashed line lies at x = γ(p, q).
take the derivative
d
dp
log g+Z
(
p, q∗(p), x−(p, q∗(p))
)
=
−8p3 + 10p2 − 8p+ 3
p(2p− 1)(4p2 − 3p+ 1) +
1
p2
log
(
4p2 − 3p+ 1
(1− p)(2p− 1)2
)
,
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and notice that, for all p ∈ (1/2, 1),
(6.125)
d
dp
log g+Z
(
p, q∗(p), x−(p, q∗(p))
)
> 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique pc ∈ (1/2, 1) for which
(6.126) g−Z
(
pc, q
∗(pc), x−(pc, q∗(pc))
)
= g+Z
(
pc, q
∗(pc), x−(pc, q∗(pc))
)
= 1.
Moreover, thanks to Lemma 2(d), the value of pc can be further characterized as the unique
p ∈ (1/2, 1) such that
(6.127) x−(pc, q∗(pc)) = γ(pc, q∗(pc)),
where γ is defined as in Eq. (6.58). In conclusion, if p ∈ (1/2, pc) the function xweq(p, ·) is
discontinuous at q∗(p).
On the other hand, if p ∈ (pc, 1), the map
(6.128) q 7→ inf {x ∈ (0, 1) : max ( log g−Z (p, q, x), log g+Z (p, q, x)) = 0} ,
is continuous in [0, 1). In fact, by Eq. (6.119), g−Z (p, q, x
−(p, q)) is decreasing in q, hence, if
q ∈ (q∗(p), 1), xweq(p, q) = inf
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : log g+Z (p, q, x) = 0
}
, which is clearly continuous.
Conversely, if q ∈ (0, q∗(p)), then the function g−Z (p, q, ·) is increasing in (0, γ(p, q)), and
the function g+Z (p, q, ·) is increasing in a neighborhood of γ(p, q). Hence, Eq. (6.128) can be
written as
(6.129) q 7→
{
inf
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : log g−Z (p, q, x) = 0
}
if q < q2(p),
inf
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : log g+Z (p, q, x) = 0
}
if q > q2(p),
where q2(p) solves
(6.130) g−Z (p, q
2(p), γ(p, q2(p))) = 1.
By definition of γ,
(6.131) g+Z (p, q
2(p), γ(p, q2(p))) = 1.
hence, there cannot be any discontinuity when passing from the first to the second branch
of Eq. (6.129).

Proof of Proposition 4. By Eq. (6.88) and Lemma 1,
xopt(p, q) = sup
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : max (fW ((1− q)p, 0), fW (q + (1− q)p, x)) ≥ 1
}
(6.132)
= sup
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : fW (q + (1− q)p, x) ≥ 1
}
(6.133)
=xopt(q + (1− q)p, 0).(6.134)
On the other hand, by Eq. (6.89),
xbeq(p, q) = sup
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : (1− p)1−x max (fW ((1− q)p, x), fW (q + (1− q)p, x)) ≥ 1
}
(6.135)
= sup
{
x ∈ (0, 1) : (1− p)1−xfW (q + (1− q)p, x) ≥ 1
}
(6.136)
≥ sup{x ∈ (0, 1) : (1− p)1−xfW (p, x) ≥ 1}(6.137)
=xbeq(q + (1− q)p, 0).(6.138)
where the inequality above follow from Lemma 1(ii), which implies that ∀(q, x) ∈ (0, 1)2
(1− p)1−xfW (q + (1− q)p, x) ≥ (1− p)1−xfW (p, x). 
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6.3. Proof for the fully supported potential. In this subsection we focus on the case in which
pi is fully supported in [0, 1]. More precisely, we will assume that for every I ⊂ [0, 1] with Leb(I) = ε
there exists some δ = δ(ε) such that
(6.139) pi(I) ≥ δ.
Proof of Theorem 1. We start by showing a concentration result for the number of profiles with a
large potential. By Eq. (6.139), for any fixed ε > 0 there exists some δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that
P
(
Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε) = δ.
It follows that the expected number of profiles with potential in the interval [1− ε, 1] is
E [|{s : Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε}|] = δ2n.(6.140)
Moreover, by the Chernoff bound, for any constant γ ∈ (0, 1)
(6.141) P (Binomial(2n, δ) < (1− γ)δ2n) ≤ exp (−Θ(2n)) .
Hence, considering the family of events
(6.142) Eε,c := {|{s : Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε]}| > c2n} ,
there exists some sufficiently small constant c = c(ε) > 0 for which
(6.143) lim
n→∞P (Eε,c) = 1.
Notice now that if Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε then the probability that SU(s) = n can be lower bounded by
(6.144) P (SU(s) = n | Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε) ≥ (1− ε)n.
Therefore,
E [|Zn|] ≥E [|Zn| | |{s : Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε]}| > c2n]P (|{s : Φ(s) ≥ 1− ε]}| > c2n)(6.145)
≥c(2(1− ε))n(6.146)
By Proposition 3,
(6.147)
|Zn|
E [|Zn|]
P−→ 1,
from which, by taking ε→ 0, follows
(6.148)
1
n
log (|Zn|) P−→ 2.

Proof of Theorem 2. Fix some s ∈ Σ and notice that
(6.149) P (s ∈ Zk) = P (SU(s) = k)P (s ∈ NE | SU(s) = k) .
It is worth noting that the quantity P (s ∈ NE | SU(s) = k) depends only on p, regardless of the
specific form of pi. In fact,
P (s ∈ NE | SU(s) = k) =P (ui(s) = 0)n−k(6.150)
=
(∫ 1
0
(1− x)dpi(x)
)n−k
(6.151)
= (1− p)n−k .(6.152)
We notice further that, if Φ(s) = x then, by the law of large numbers, for all ε > 0
lim
n→∞P
(
SU(s)
n
∈ [x− ε, x+ ε] ∣∣ Φ(s) ∈ [x− ε/2, x+ ε/2]) = 1.(6.153)
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Being pi fully supported we have
P (Φ(s) ∈ [x− ε/2, x+ ε/2]) = Ω(1),(6.154)
and therefore
E [| {s : Φ(s) ∈ [x− ε/2, x+ ε/2]} |] = Θ(2n),(6.155)
so that by the independence of the sequence (Φ(s))s∈Σ we have
| {s : Φ(s) ∈ [x− ε/2, x+ ε/2]} |
E [| {s : Φ(s) ∈ [x− ε/2, x+ ε/2]} |]
P−→ 1.(6.156)
Therefore, by Eqs. (6.153) and (6.156) we conclude that for any arbitrarily small interval [x− ε, x+
ε] ∈ [0, 1] we have Θ(2n) profiles with such an ASU. Moreover, by Eq. (6.152), a profile with ASU
x± ε is a NE with probability
(1− p)(1−x+ε)n ≤ P (s ∈ NE | SU(s) ∈ [(x− ε)n, (x+ ε)n]) ≤ (1− p)(1−x−ε)n.(6.157)
Hence,
[2(1− p)(1−x+ε)]n ≤ E [|{s : s ∈ NE, SU(s)/n ∈ [x− ε, x+ ε]}|] ≤ [2(1− p)(1−x−ε)]n.(6.158)
The theorem follows by letting ε→ 0 in Eq. (6.158), by using Proposition 3 and by noting that
(6.159) 2(1− p)(1−x) = 1 ⇐⇒ p ≥ 1
2
and x = h(p).

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